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DENNIS D. MURAOKA* and WALTER J. MEAD**

Economic Issues in Federal
Geothermal Leasing Procedures
ABSTRACT
The generation of electricity using geothermal resources has grown
rapidly since 1960. In that year, only thirty-three million kilowatthours of electricity were generatedfrom geothermal sources. By
1984 geothermal sources accountedfor 7,715 million kilowatt-hours
of electricity. Much of the land with geothermal potential is under
government control. In 1970, the GeothermalSteam Act became law.
This legislationauthorizedthe leasing offederal landsfor geothermal
development and provided leasing guidelines. In this paper we analyze federal leasing regulationsfrom the perspective of economic
efficiency. While some leasing provisions promoted economic efficiency, others are lacking in this regard.Recommendations are made
to improve the economic efficiency of existing regulations.

INTRODUCTION
Using heat and steam generated within the earth to produce electricity
is still in its infancy. Commercial production of electricity from geothermal steam in the United States began on June 25, 1960. The first
geothermal power plant was located on private lands at the Geysers, about
ninety miles north of San Francisco. This original Sonoma County facility
had 11 to 12 megawatts [MW] of electric power generating capacity.
Over the last twenty-five years generating capacity at the Geysers has
grown to 1,379 MW. This is enough electricity to serve about 1,300,000
people and is roughly the electrical capacity of a large nuclear plant.'
Ultimately the Geysers may grow to 3,000 MW of capacity. All geothermal steam facilities in the United States may have 20,000 MW of
generating capacity by the year 2000.2 This capacity would be equivalent
to 700,000 barrels of oil use per day in an oil based electric power
generating system.' Since 1960, when only 33 million kilowatt-hours
*Associate Professor of Economics, California State University, Long Beach.
**Professor of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara.
I. The Largest Geothermal Complex, 13 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY, No. 2 (Feb. 1985).
2. Testimony of Carel Otte Before the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining of the Interior and
InsularAffairs Committee, H.R. REP. 740 & H.R. REP. 2577, bills to amend the Geothermal Steam
Act of 1970 for the purpose of enhancing the development of geothermal resources situated beneath
federal lands, 8 (1979).
3. Id.
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of electricity were generated in the United States, geothermal electricity
production has grown steadily to 7,715 million kilowatt-hours (Table 1).
The first competitive geothermal leasing of federal lands was conducted
for tracts located in California on January 22, 1974. Since the issuance
of these leases and through fiscal year 1984, 582 leases have been awarded
on a competitive basis (Table 2). An additional 2,875 leases have been
issued noncompetitively over this time period. The total acreage leased
through 1984 is 6,146,848 acres of which 1,068,967 acres were leased
competitively. To date, bonus payments for competitive leases have totaled $55,285,577. At the end of fiscal year 1984, 1,608 leases remained
TABLE 1
Net Generation of Electricity from United States
Geothermal Sources from 1960 through 1984

Year

Yearend
Installed
Nameplate Capacity
(thousand kilowatts)

Net
Generation
(million
kilowatthours)

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

12
12
12
27
27
27
27
55
84
84

33
94
100
168
204
189
188
316
436
615

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

84
203
322
441
441
559
559
559
559
742

525
548
1,453
1,966
2,453
3,246
3,616
3,582
2,978
3,889

1980
1981
1982
1984
1985

1,005
1,005
1,129
1,331
1,354

5,073
5,686
4,843
6,075
7,715

Source: Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 1984.
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TABLE 2
Federal Geothermal Leases Issued from 1975 through 1984,
by Year and by State
Non-Competitive Leases

Competitive Leases
By
Fiscal
Year

Number
of
Leases

Acres
Leased

Number
of
Leases

Bonus
Received

Acres
Leased

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

44
85
39
73
31
31
8
172
85
14

90,957
165,286
66,648
135,121
35,317
58,847
16,235
319,533
163,277
17,746

4,915,831.16
1,417,781.84
743,238.50
3,048,251.79
17,078,084.39
754,077.85
1,167,853.09
23,593,861.43
2,145,375.77
421,221.63

85
428
227
278
106
294
145
246
819
247

168,732
749,123
377,342
505,006
150,618
472,112
259,264
548,002
1,420,685
426,997

Total

582

1,068,967

55,285,577.45

2,875

5,077,881

By State
Arizona
California
Colorado
Idaho
Nevada
New Mexico
Oregon
Utah
Washington

0
195
3
20
87
62
163
51
I

0
329,052
5,037
37,791
177,198
101,114
320,624
93,537
4,614

0
41,539,701.26
13,576.26
223,108.99
2,669,516.43
1,789,791.76
4,642,433.86
4,396,498.19
950.70

13
125
43
264
754
152
1,169
257
97

21,541
293,659
50,949
448,573
1,341,020
259,251
1,984,895
488,198
189,795

Total

582

1,068,967

55,275,577.45

2,875

5,077,881

Source: Bureau of Land Management, Public Land Statistics, annual volumes, 1975 through
1984.

in effect. 4 Of these, twelve leases are currently in production.' In fiscal
year 1984, the total value of geothermal resources produced on federal
leases was $46,737,453.6 Royalties paid to the federal government on
this production totaled $5,940,45 1. Most federal leases have been issued
for lands located in California. However, federal leases have also been
awarded in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon,
4. Bureau of Land Management,

MANAGING THE NATION'S PUBLIC LANDS: FISCAL YEAR

1984,

15 (1985).
5. 1d.

6. Bureau of Land Management, 169 PUBLIC

LAND STATISTICS

1984, 138 (Aug. 1985). The total

value of geothermal resources includes the value of geothermal steam and demineralized water
produced from federal leases.
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Utah and Washington. The best prospects for geothermal energy development are found in the western states.
In this paper the policies governing the issuance of federal leases for
geothermal energy are analyzed. We begin with a description of current
federal leasing procedures, and follow up with an economic analysis of
these procedures. Finally, we conclude with a summary of findings and
recommendations.
CURRENT FEDERAL GEOTHERMAL LEASING PROCEDURES
On December 24, 1970, President Richard M. Nixon signed the Geothermal Steam Act. 7 This legislation authorized the Department of the
Interior to lease federal lands for geothermal development and provided
leasing guidelines. Following precedents established by federal offshore
and competitive onshore oil and gas leasing, federal geothermal leasing
procedures begin with the private sector or the Interior Department nominating public lands for leasing. Nominated lands may be designated as
"known geothermal resource areas" [KGRA]. These KGRAs are lands
"in which the geology, nearby discoveries, competitive interests, or other
indicia would, in the opinion of the Secretary [of the Interior], engender
a belief in men who are experienced in the subject matter that the prospects
for extraction of geothermal steam or associated geothermal resources
are good enough to warrant expenditures of money for that purpose.'
Such lands must be leased at competitive auctions.9 Lands not classified
as a KGRAs are leased on a noncompetitive, first-come, first-served
basis. "
If it is decided to lease a nominated area competitively, notice of the
lease sale is published." Information contained in this publication includes
"the time and place of sale, the manner in which bids may be submitted,
the description of the lands, and the terms and conditions of the sale."' 2
Federal leases may be no smaller than 640 acres nor larger than 2,560
acres. 3 Before the lease auction, geochemical and geophysical surveying,
including test drilling to a depth of 500 feet, may be undertaken with the
approval of the Interior Department. 4 Exploratory drilling is not allowed.
Prospective lessees submit sealed cash bonus bids which are opened
the day of the auction.' 5 A cash bonus is a nonrefundable lump sum
7. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-25 (1983).
8. 43 C.FR. §3200.0-5k (1986).
9. 43 C.F.R. §3220.1 (1973).
10. 43 C.FR. §3210.1 (1983).
II. 43 C.FR. §3220.2 (1983).
12, 43 C.FR. §3220.3a (1983).
13. 43 C.FR. §3203.2 (1979).
14. 43 C.F.R. §3209 (1983).
15. 43 C.FR. § 3220.4a (1983).
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payment offered by the winning bidder to acquire a lease. All bids must
be accompanied by a deposit equal to one-fifth of the bonus bid.' 6 The
winning bidder is the party submitting the highest cash bonus bid, although the government reserves the right to reject any or all bids.' 7 The
deposits of all unsuccessful bidders are returned when the lease is awarded.
The winning bidder must remit the balance of the bonus bid either in a
single payment or, in two equal annual installments over the next two
years.
In addition to the bonus payment, the winning bidder must also make
subsequent rental and royalty payments to the federal government. Before
the commencement of geothermal steam production, annual rental payments are required. The minimum rental payment is $1 per acre19 ; the
actual rental rate for each lease is specified by the Interior Department
before the lease auction. For noncompetitive leases, the annual rental has
generally been set at the minimum level. For competitive leases, the
rental rate has been customarily set at $2 per acre.
Once production begins, royalty payments are made in lieu of rental
payments. The minimum royalty payment is $2 per acre.' Actual royalty
rates, like rental rates, are specified by the Interior Department before
the lease auction, but they may not be less than ten percent or, more than
fifteen percent of the value of the steam produced.2 For federal leases at
the Geysers and other KGRAs, the royalty rate has typically been set at
12.5 percent. For noncompetitive leases the royalty rate has generally
been set at ten percent. Royalty payments must also be made for other
valuable by-products which are recovered. For many minerals, the royalty
rates are stated elsewhere in federal regulations. For other valuable byproducts, in particular demineralized water, the royalty rate is specified
by the Interior Department but cannot exceed five percerit.22
In return for these payments, a lessee receives the exclusive right to
explore and develop a lease tract for a primary lease term of ten years. 23
The lease can be extended for five years if the tract is being diligently
explored at the end of the primary lease term. 24 If during the primary
lease term commercial quantities of steam are produced, the lease is
extended. The extension continues as long as commercial quantities of
steam are produced, but not for more than thirty-five years.' If at the
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
43 C.F.R.
43 C.FR.
43 C.F.R.
43 C.F.R.
43 C.F.R.
43 C.FR.
43 C.F.R.
43 C.F.R.
43 C.F.R.

§3220.5 (1983).
§3220.4a (1983).
§3205.3-2a (1979).
§3205.3-5c (1979).
§3205.3-5a (1979).
§3205.3-5b (1979).
§3203.1-2 (1979).
§3203.1-4b (1979).
§3203.1-3a (1979).
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end of these extensions the lease is still productive, the lessee has a
preferential right to renew the lease for an additional forty years at terms
are
deemed appropriate by the Interior Department.26 If only by-products
27
produced, a lease may be extended at the most for five years.
To encourage diligent exploration, lessees are required to make explo-28
ration expenditures during the fifth through fifteenth years of the lease.
Diligent exploration includes, but is not limited to geochemical surveys,
heat flow measurement, core drilling, and drilling of test wells.29 The
minimum per acre annual exploration expenditures are shown in Table
3. All exploration expenditures made during the first five years of a lease,
and all exploration expenditures during subsequent years in excess of the
required minimum, are carried forward to meet future minimum expenditures." In any year in which minimum exploration expenditures are
required, lessees may opt to pay an additional $3 per acre in rental
payments instead of making the required exploration expenditure. Failure
to make required exploration expenditures or additional rental payments
can result in the loss of the lease. 3
In addition to the above leasing terms and procedures, the Geothermal
Steam Act of 197032 also requires that the Interior Department approve
TABLE 3
Diligent Exploration
Expenditures
Lease
Year

Expenditure
Per Acre

6
7
8
9
to
Ii
12
13
14
15

4
6
8
10
12
12
12
12
12
12

Source: 43 CFR § 3203.5
26.
27.
28.
29.

43 C.F.R. §3203.1-4e (1979).
43 C.FR. §3203.1-4a (1979).
43 C.F.R. §3203.5 (1979).
Id., for a description of these geothermal exploration techniques, see H. Christopher & H.

Armstead, GEOTHERMAL ENERGY; ITS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ENERGY
NEEDS OF MAN, 68-79 (London, England: E. & F.N. Spon Ltd. 1983),

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 30 U.SC. 88 1001-25 (1983), supra note 7.
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any unit agreements among lessees.33 Such collective agreements are
sometimes struck between lessees to improve resource conservation and
increase the general profitability of a geothermal field. Owing to the nature
of geothermal steam, independent owners of adjacent leases which overlie
a single field may drill excessive numbers of wells. A unit agreement
among the lessees will avoid this excessive drilling. Such an agreement
may be required by the Interior Department when warranted.'
The Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 also restricts the ownership of
geothermal leases in two ways. First, ownership is limited to "citizens
of the United States, associations of such citizens, corporations organized
under the laws of the United States, or of any State or the District of
Columbia, or governmental units, including, without limitation municipalities." 3 Foreign ownership is prohibited. Second, the total acreage
owned by any individual, association or corporation is limited. Until
December 26, 1985, total ownership was limited to no more than 20,480
acres in any one state. Effective December 26, 1985, the total acreage
limitation was increased to 51,200 acres.36 Land in unitized leases is not
counted in calculating the acreage limitation. 37
Lastly, the Geothermal Steam Act allows the Interior Department to
adjust lease terms on a regular basis. Rental and royalty rates on the value
of the steam can be adjusted every twenty years, beginning thirty-five
years after the commencement of geothermal steam production.3" Neither
rental nor royalty rates may be increased by more than fifty percent for
any twenty year interval and in no case may the royalty rate for geothermal
steam exceed 22.5 percent.39 Other lease terms and conditions may be
adjusted at ten year intervals beginning ten years after commencement
of commercial geothermal steam production.' 0
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF GEOTHERMAL LEASING PROCEDURES
Before analyzing federal geothermal leasing procedures, it is necessary
to identify the basic economic goals of natural resource management.
There is widespread agreement among economists that the goal of natural
resource management policy should be to maximize the present value of
the economic rent derivable from resources."' Economic rent is the pay33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

43 C.F.R. §3203.1-4a (1979).
43 C.F.R. §3243.3-1 (1983).
43 C.F.R. §3202.1 (1983).
43 C.ER. §3201.2a (1983).
43 C.F.R. § 3201.2 (2)c (1983).
43 C.F.R. §3205.3-9. (1976)
Id.
43 C.F.R. §3209(a)(1) (1983).
See, e.g., Stephen L. McDonald, THE LEASING OF FEDERAL LANDS FOR FOSSIL FUELS PRODUCTION, at 24-35 (Baltimore, Md: The Johns Hopkins Press 1979).
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ment to a factor of production, like public lands, above that is necessary
to retain the factor in a particular use. For public lands used for geothermal
energy production, economic rent is the difference between the discounted
social value of the revenues that can be generated from the geothermal
steam and the discounted social costs of production. These social costs
include all necessary costs of production except payments to the government and they include external costs.42 The costs and benefits are discounted so that they are stated in present values. This acknowledges that
costs and benefits occur at different points in time. Economists are interested in the development of any resource having a positive present
value. The optimum time for development and production should be
determined by maximizing the discounted present value of the resource.
The maximization of economic rent is the economic meaning of resource
conservation.
Leasing procedures affect the economic rent that can be derived from
a resource. Those procedures which lead to excessive costs, reduced
revenues, or the suboptimal of development, reduce economic rent and
are to be avoided.
A second consideration in public land management is who ought to
receive the economic rent derived from federal lands. Positive economic
theory can contribute little to this income distribution issue. We assert
that the American people, as the owners of these lands, are entitled to
the economic rent. The federal government, as trustee, should collect this
value. As a consequence, federal geothermal leasing procedures are evaluated below based on their ability to maximize and collect economic rent.
Pre-Leasing Procedures
From the perspective of resource conservation, the federal government
employs both effective and ineffective policies for leasing federal lands.
The policy of allowing the private sector to nominate federal lands for
leasing promotes resource conservation. Conservation requires that the
most promising lands be developed first. Private developers can be expected to nominate first those lands which hold the most promise for
geothermal potential.
The policy of issuing leases for lands not classified as KGRAs on a
noncompetitive basis is not consistent with resource conservation. Resources are not conserved unless the land is developed by the most efficient
producer. The first-come, first-served approach to lease allocation does
not select the most efficient producer except by chance. Furthermore,
because payment to the government for the lease is made only as geo42. An example of an external cost is the damage to the environment due to geothermal development.
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thermal steam or by-products are produced, a valuable asset, the right to
delay exploration for geothermal steam, is transferred from the public
sector to the private sector with partial payment (see discussion of rental
payments below). To select the most efficient producer and thereby promote conservation, and to collect the economic rent from public lands,
all leases should be issued competitively.
Bonus Bidding
The cash bonus bid variable used in competitive lease auctions is highly
effective in promoting economic efficiency and collecting economic rent.
The payments from lessees to the government, though viewed as costs
of production by lessees, are transfer payments. As transfer payments,
they should be structured so that they have a minimal effect on marginal
production and production timing decisions. Bonus payments are optimal
in this respect. Because the cash bonus is an obligation that the firm
incurs when the lease is awarded, and the amount of the payment cannot
be altered by future events, the bonus payment is viewed as a fixed cost
by the firm and as such does not affect marginal decisions. In contrast,
other payments made by lessees, including the rental and royalty payments
discussed below, are contingent on future production (or nonproduction)
and as a consequence influence exploration and development decisions.
Bonus bidding is also effective in identifying the most efficient producer. Prospective lessees formulate their bonus bids by first estimating
the revenues and costs of exploring, developing and producing a property
over time. The present value of the net revenue in each time period is
then calculated and summed across all time periods. Each prospective
lessee's maximum bonus bid is this sum. Assuming a competitive lease
auction, each bidder will submit a bid at or near this maximum value.
The use of sealed bidding encourages firms to bid near their estimated
full value of a lease. In preparing a bid for a sealed bid auction, each
bidder is uncertain as to how many competitors there will be and what
they will bid. Unlike an oral auction in which a bidder can rebid if their
current bid is not high enough to win the auction, sealed bidders are
allowed only one opportunity. As a consequence, even when only one
bid is submitted for a lease, the bid is likely to reflect the bidder's full
value of the land.43
If each firm formulates its sealed bid at the full estimated value of the
lease, the firm which submits the largest bonus bid will tend to be the
most efficient producer. In the case of a pure bonus bid, it should be
43. For further discussion of oral versus sealed bidding, see Walter Mead, Asbjom Moseidjord,

Dennis Muraoka, & Philip Sorensen, OFFSHORE

LANDS: OIL AND GAS LEASING AND CONSERVATION
Francisco 1985), at 119-22.

ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, PAC. INST. PUB. POL'Y REs. (San
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further noted that because the bonus bid determines the payment to the
government by the winning bidder, bonus bidding transfers the economic
rent to the public coffers. If the winning bidder has made his maximum
bid, the firm can make a normal return on its investment with any additional return being paid to the government as economic rent transfers.
Although there are many advantages of bonus bidding from the perspective of economic theory, it does have its disadvantages. Bonus bidding
is subject to three general criticisms. First, the lump sum cash payment
may serve as a barrier to entry for small firms." If so, competition for
leases may be reduced and firms may not be forced to bid their full
valuation of a lease. Second, bonus bidding places most of the uncertainty
of geothermal exploration and development on the lessee. 5 If the prospective lessees are risk averse, they will reduce the level of their bids to
compensate for the risk that they must bear if they are the winning bidder.
Third, the bonus payment for a lease may not always closely correspond
to the ultimate value of the lease.' Sometimes leases prove to be much
more valuable than the original estimate reflected in the bonus payment,
while at other times a lease will turn out to be worthless even though it
originally fetched a large cash bonus.
Although no study has been made of geothermal leases to test for these
adverse effects, an extensive analysis of federal offshore oil and gas leases
has been completed by the authors. These leases are generally issued
using bonus bidding with a fixed royalty payment amounting to one-sixth
of subsequent production. The results of this analysis show that large
firms have not had an advantage over smaller firms in offshore lease
acquisition. Furthermore, the rate of return earned by lessees on these
leases is such that they have not reduced bonus bids greatly to accommodate for the uncertainty inherent in offshore oil and gas development.
There is no evidence that successful bidders are risk averse. In an independent study of offshore leasing, James L. Smith found that although
there is risk aversion among offshore lessees, the level of risk aversion
varies inversely with firm size. 7 Smith found that the largest companies
appear to be risk nuetral." Lastly, although it is true that a perfect correlation does not exist between the bonus payment and the ultimate value
of a lease on a lease specific basis, the bonus and lease value are positively
44. R. Jones, W. Mead, & P. Sorensen, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of
1978, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 895 (1979).
45. W. Mead, A. Moseidjord, & D. Muraoka, Alternative Bid Variables as Instruments of OCS
Leasing Policy, 5 CONTEMPORARY POLICY ISSUES 1,at 38-39 (1984).
46. Supra note 44, at 895-96.
47. J. Smith, Risk Aversion and Bidding Behavior for Offshore Petroleum Leases, 30 J. INDUS.
EcON., at 251-69 (Mar. 1982).
48. Id.
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and significantly correlated, and in the aggregate, bonus bidding has
collected the full economic rent from offshore leases.49
There are several reasons to believe that bonus bidding would be similarly effective in issuing geothermal leases. First, the dollar value of the
winning bids is much smaller for geothermal leases than for offshore
leases. The average winning bonus bid for geothermal leases from 1975
through 1984 was $94,992 (see Table 2) while the average bonus bid for
offshore oil and gas leases issued between 1954 and 1975 was $6.3
million." This.would suggest that the potential barrier to entry posed by
the bonus payment in geothermal leasing would be less than that for
offshore leasing where it has not proved to be a problem. Second, geothermal lessees areable to spread their bonus bid over a three year period.
This option is not available to offshore lessees. It would have the effect
of further reducing the possible barrier to entry posed by the bonus
payment.
One small drawback of allowing firms to pay their bonus bid over a
three year period is that a firm might discover early that the lease is
worthless and walk away from the remaining unpaid balance of the bonus
payment. Regulations require that any portion of the unpaid bonus payment is immediately due when a lessee surrenders'a lease. 5 If a particular
geothermal lease is a small portion of a firm's operations, the firm will
of course make the payment. However, a small company formed for the
sole purpose of developing a particular geothermal field may find it preferential to not. pay the balance of the bonus payment and file for bankruptcy instead. If small firms bid with a view toward the bankruptcy
option, and large firms do not consider this option, the small firms receive
a bidding advantage relative to large firms. This situation distorts the
bidding process of selecting the most efficient firm.
Given the option of remitting 100 percent of a bonus bid at the time
a lease is awarded or deferring a portion of the payment without interest
for up to two years, a profit-maximizing firm will always opt to defer
payment. This would seem to reduce the value of the total payment to
the government; but because the option is known to all prospective bidders
in advance of the lease auction, firms will adjust their bid levels upward
to reflect the value of deferring payment. Making the balance of any
remaining bonus payments due on the surrender of a lease creates an
49. A complete review of our analysis of offshore leases may be found in supra note 44, at 4584.
50. W. Mead, P. Sorensen, A. Moseidjord & D. Muraoka, Additional Studies of Competition and
Performance in OCS Oil and Gas Sales, 1954-1975, USGS CONrRAcT No. 14-08-0001-18678, at
41 (1980).
51. 43 CF.R. § 3220.4(a) (1986).
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incentive for a lessee to hold a worthless lease until the time that the
final bonus payment installment is due. This latter effect is offset slightly
by the annual rental payments described below. In any case, the magnitude
of the adverse effects of allowing the bonus payment to be paid in three
installments is likely to be small.
As noted above, the hypothesis that firms adjust their bonus bids downward to accommodate for uncertainty is not supported by empirical evidence from offshore oil and gas leases. One reason that uncertainty may
not be as great a problem is that geothermal leases are not held in isolation,
but instead comprise a portion of a portfolio of projects undertaken by
most lessees. The proper measure of uncertainty of a geothermal lease
is not its riskiness when considered in isolation, but its contribution to
the riskiness of a well-diversified portfolio. Only the uncertainty which
cannot be eliminated through diversification will command a risk premium.
Rental Payments
Although bonus payments promote resource conservation, the same
cannot be said for rental and royalty payments. As noted earlier, rental
and royalty payments are contingent on production (or nonproduction).
Rental payments may be thought of as payments for the right to delay
drilling and production operations for a year. These payments are designed
to encourage "diligent" (speedy) exploration of a lease once it is awarded.
They will have this effect because they can be avoided by commencing
production of geothermal steam.
While rental payments will have their desired effect, a more fundamental question is whether society benefits from encouraging speedy
exploration and development. Economic theory does not necessarily favor
early development. Given free choice, a lessee will allocate drilling and
production over time so that the present value of a lease is maximized.
This is consistent with resource conservation. Sometimes this calls for
early and rapid development, while in other instances, delayed drilling
is preferred. In either case, the proper action will be taken by profitmaximizing lessees. Encouragement of speedy development is, therefore,
unnecessary, and to the extent that it alters marginal decision-making,
undesirable.
The cost of encouraging early drilling and production with rental payments or through other devices52 is not borne by the lessees. Recall that
in formulating bonus bids, firms deduct all estimated costs from estimated
revenues. Although rental payments are not true costs in an economic
52. Other devices designed to encourage early production include the primary lease term and
required exploration expenditures.
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sense (like the bonus payment they are transfer payments), they are
perceived as costs by the firm and as such their present value is deducted
from the bonus bid. Hence, bonus payments are reduced dollar per dollar
with the present value of expected future rental payments. In addition to
the reduction in bonus pyments, if rental payments reduce the overall
present value of the geothermal resource through premature exploration
and development, a social loss is incurred. 3
Royalty Payments
Royalty payments, like rental payments, alter marginal production and
timing decisions. The intent behind requiring royalty payments from
lessees is for the government to share in the future value of these resources
at the cost of foregoing front-end bonus income. Unfortunately, royalty
payments have three adverse effects. First, they cause delays in drilling
and production. The reason for the delays is because royalty payments
increase the cost of geothermal operations but have no effect on the
revenues. This reduces the present value of a geothermal lease and the
rate of return on geothermal investments to the lessee.
Second, royalty payments will lead to the premature abandonment of
a geothermal field. A geothermal field will be operated for an additional
time period when the benefits of continuing operations for one more period
exceed their cost. One cost perceived by the firm is the royalty payment
of ten to fifteen percent of the gross value of the steam produced. Although
it may be worthwhile for a firm to continue operations for one more
period without having to make a royalty payment, the inclusion of the
royalty payment as a marginal production cost will ultimately make continued operations unprofitable. However, as is true of bonus and rental
payments, royalties are transfer payments. The effect that they have on
marginal decisions is undesirable. It is in this sense that the abandonment
of a geothermal field which occurs early as a result of the royalty payment
is a premature abandonment. In extreme cases, royalties may result in
the nondevelopment of an otherwise desirable field.
Third, some investments intended to enhance steam production which
would be profitable without royalty payments will become submarginal
with royalty payments. These effects have been illustrated in offshore
leasing which has occasionally been undertaken using the royalty rate as
the bid variable, and in federal national forest timber sales where the bid
variable is a royalty-like entity called a log-scale payment.'
As with rental payments, royalty payments are not ultimately borne
by the lessee. Instead the present value of expected royalty payments
53. For further analysis of the effects of rental payments, see supra note 43, at I11.
54. For further discussion of the adverse effects of royalty payments and for a review of the
empirical evidence in this area, see id. at 86-96.
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along with other costs is subtracted from revenues in calculating bonus
bids. Thus, royalty payments are borne by the land owner, in this case
the American people. To the extent that royalty payments alter production
decisions, they waste resources.
Requiring royalty payments based on the value of the steam produced
raises difficult valuation problems and leads to heavy administrative costs
for the government and compliance costs for lessees. There is no market
where geothermal steam is traded. This fact immediately places the lessor
and lessee in conflict. The lessee has an incentive to underestimate the
value of the steam so that royalty payments will be minimized. The
government as lessor will be obligated to contest the lessee's steam value
estimates. In. the absense of objective price information, steam valuation
is likely to be the subject of continuing costly litigation. These administrative costs dissipate economic rents collected by the government.
Lessees will estimate their future compliance and litigation costs due to
this conflict and subtract these costs from their bonus bids. Thus, these
royalty-associated costs are a "doubled-barreled" loss to the public in
the form of reduced economic rent.
Resource conservation requires that both rental and royalty payments
be eliminated. The intent of rental payments is to encourage early drilling
and development. But, as discussed above, encouraging early development may be undesirable. The intent of royalty payments is for the
government to share in the value of future production of steam from
geothermal fields. However, the full value of the economic rent from
geothermal resources will be captured on average by bonus payments.
Furthermore, bonus payments will capture the economic rent without the
need for costly monitoring of the value of geothermal steam production
as happens with royalty payments. Rental and royalty payments are unnecessary to collect economic rent, and they discourage resource conservation.
Diligence Requirements
The imposition of a ten year primary lease term, like rental payments,
is designed to encourage diligent production. Lessees are constrained by
the primary lease term because they may wish to explore and develop a
lease over a longer time period. The shorter the primary lease term, the
more binding the constraint. By constraining lessees, lower bonus bids
are submitted. A long primary lease term is recommended. Ideally the
primary lease term should be eliminated altogether."
In addition to the primary lease term, annual exploration expenditures
are required in the fifth through fifteenth years of a lease to encourage
55. See id. at 111-12.
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diligent exploration. When a lessee acquires a lease, he formulates an
exploration plan. Exploration expenditures are made to acquire information about a lease. In the absence of required expenditures, the decision
to make additional exploration expenditures is based on the expected
value of the benefits of these expenditures as compared with their costs.
As more information is collected, the expected benefits of additional
exploration are altered. The acquisition of information may encourage or
discourage exploration. Required exploration expenditures distort exploration decisions by encouraging early and excessive exploration. As is
the case with-the primary lease term, to the extent that required expenditures vary from those warranted by present value maximization, the
present value of a lease is reduced and lessees will reduce the level of
their bids accordingly. Conservation would be served by allowing the
lessees to make exploration decisions based on weighing of benefits and
costs rather than on avoiding the potential loss of the lease. These required
expenditures should be eliminated.
Other Leasing Policies
Federal regulations restrict the size of geothermal leases. Leases may
be no smaller than 640 acres nor larger than 2,560 acres. The upper bound
for lease size is too small to encourage commercial production. According
to industry sources, "a minimum of 10,000 to 15,000 acres in a known
geothermal resource area must be explored to develop productive geothermal resources sufficient to supply a commercially economic facility
of a minimum unit size of fifty MW of electric generating power." 56 With
the 2,560 acre per lease size limitation, a minimum of four leases will
be necessary to span a 10,000 acre KGRA. "Division of a reservoir
between separate leaseholds reduces the average value of geothermal
discoveries. In addition, where resource areas are divided, exploration is
delayed, as each leaseholder seeks to benefit from exploratory work performed by the remaining participants in the area." 57
The total lease holdings of individual firms are also restricted to not
more than 51,200 acres in any state. These procedures are designed to
restrict the market power of large firms in the geothermal lease market
and aid smaller firms in acquiring leases. Such policies are unwise. Leases
should be awarded to the most efficient firm, regardless of its size. If
56. Statement of Gary Wicks, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Land and Water Resources, Department
of the Interior, Before the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining of the Interior & InsularAffairs
Committee, on H.R. REP. 740 and H.R. REP. 2577, bills to amend the Geothermal Steam Act of
1970 for the purpose of enhancing the development of geothermal resources situated beneath federal
lands, at 98 (1979).
57. D. Sacarto, State Policies for Geothermal Development: Uncovering a Major Resource,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, 47 (1975).
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acreage limitations result in leases being allocated to less efficient firms,
resources are not conserved. Furthermore, more acreage may be required
to efficiently develop only one field. Thus a firm may be restricted to
developing a few fields on federal lands in a state. Conservation is not
served unless leaseholdings are of sufficient size to facilitate efficient
production. From a resource conservation perspective, the recent increase
in total acreage limits from 20,480 acres to 51,200 acres per state was
wise. Ideally, there should be no restrictions on individual leaseholdings.
Ownership of geothermal leases is also restricted to Americans and
American companies. The intent of this requirement may be easily circumvented. If foreigners desire a geothermal lease they may form a
corporation in the United States which would be able to own geothermal
leases.5 8 Additionally, as noted above, conservation requires that leases
be awarded to the most efficient producer, regardless of nationality. The
rationalization for limiting ownership to Americans is based on national
security considerations. Unless national security is threatened by foreign
ownership, ownership should not be limited.
Federal regulations also encourage the unitization of individual leases
which overlie a single geothermal field. To the extent that this situation
occurs, it is wise to encourage unitization, rather than other forms of
government regulation (such as well spacing restrictions). However, the
costs of negotiating and maintaining a unit agreement can be avoided if
lease sizes are selected to encompass an entire geothermal field. Consideration should be given to this option as well.
Lastly, the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 allows royalty rates and
other lease terms to be adjusted on a regular basis. The allowance of
peridodic adjustment of lease terms every ten years has made utility
companies reluctant to invest in geothermal power plants. Their concern
is that after a large capital expenditure has been made to build a power
plant, lease terms will be altered making their investment unprofitable
and possibly worthless. When a gas or coal fired power plant is built and
fuel can not be acquired from one source, it can be purchased from
another. For geothermal steam plants, if terms are adjusted so that geothermal steam cannot be acquired from the underlying steam field, then
other steam cannot be brought in to replace it.
Regulations also allow rental rates and royalty rates to be periodically
revised. These policies are likely to have little effect on the firms acquiring
leases today because the regulations do not allow the government to adjust
rates for thirty-five years. Nevertheless, these regulations are not wise.
First, as the time approaches when the Interior Department may adjust
rates and the nature of the adjustments is anticipated, firms will take
58. Michael Lindsey & Paul Supton,
DEVELOPMENT,

GEOTHERMAL ENERGY: LEGAL PROBLEMS OF RESOURCE
56-57 (Stanford, CA: Stan. L. Sch., 1976).
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whatever steps they can to minimize the adverse effects of the changes
on the firm. Second, such regulations introduce uncertainty into geothermal leasing which would not exist in the absence of the regulation.
Rather than making it easy for the government to "change the rules in
the middle of the game," the laws governing natural resource disposal
policies should be designed so that governmental agencies cannot alter
lease terms in ways that are not predictable at the point of bidding.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A summary of current geothermal leasing procedures and our recommendations for these procedures is contained in Table 4. At present,
TABLE 4
Summary of Geothermal Leasing Procedures
Current Procedure

Recommendation

A. Tracts may be nominated by private sector
or Interior Department

No change

B. KGRAs are leased competitively, other
lands are leased noncompetitively

All lands should be leased competitively

C. Auctions conducted using sealed bonus bid

No change

D. Rental payments due prior to
commencement of production

Eliminate rental payment

E. Minimum exploration expenditures required
during 5th through 15th year of lease

Eliminate minimum exploration
expenditures

F. Royalty payments due after commencement
of production

Eliminate royalty payment

G. Leases are issued for a tO year primary
lease term

Extend primary lease term or eliminate
altogether

H. Lease size must be greater than 640 acres
and less than 2,560 acres

Eliminate upper bound to allow leasing of
entire field

I. Overall acreage limitation of 51,200 acres
per state

Eliminate acreage limitation

J.

Lease ownership limited to Americans

Eliminate restriction on foreign ownership
unless such ownership poses a threat to
national security

K. Encourage unitization of leases which
overlie a field

No change

L. Lease terms and conditions may be
adjusted by Interior Department

Eliminate provisions allowing adjustment
of lease terms and conditions
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federal lands may be nominated for geothermal leasing by either the
private sector or the Interior Department. This policy is wise because it
will generally lead to the best geothermal prospects being leased first.
All geothermal leases should be awarded by a sealed bid auction with
the level of the bonus payment serving as the bid variable. In the long
run, this bidding procedure is likely to identify the most efficient producer
to operate the lease and collect the full economic rent for the land owner,
the American people.
Rental payments, required minimum exploration expenditures, and the
ten year primary lease term are policies designed to encourage diligent
production. However, profit maximizing firms will time exploration and
production so that the present value of the resource is maximized. This
realization renders diligence policies unnecessary and potentially detrimental.
Royalty payments are used by the government as a trade-off against
present and certain bonus payments to share the future benefits of geothermal steam with the lessee. They have this effect but at a cost of
distorting exploration and production decisions. Although on a lease by
lease basis, bonus payments do not bear as close a relationship to ultimate
lease value as royalty payments, bonus payments are effective in the
aggregate and do not have the same distorting side effects or administrative
costs as royalty payments. Royalty payments should be kept at as low a
rate as possible, ideally zero.
Individual leases are limited to 2,560 acres and the leaseholdings of
any individual or firm are limited to 51,200 acres per state. These restrictions may be too small to allow for efficient exploration and production and should be expanded. The ownership of geothermal leases is
also restricted to Americans. Unless foreign ownership poses a threat to
national security, ownership restrictions based on nationality should be
abolished.
Finally, the Interior Department is empowered to adjust royalty and
rental rates, and other lease terms on a periodic basis. This policy introduces unnecessary uncertainty into the geothermal leasing process which
discourages investment and reduces bonus bids. It also distorts lessee
decision making. The government should not be allowed to alter lease
terms in any way after the auction.
Many of the recommendations discussed above cannot be implemented
unless the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 is amended. This may be
difficult because some of the recommendations will not be popular. They
are, however, worth pursuing because they both increase the value of
geothermal resources and improve the ability of the government to collect
this value for the American people.

